在公司里,不能只关注内部管理过程,最终没有销售。
  内与外的平衡,由内到外的转变,是公司进步的过程。

  遇到一位基金经理,原来是美国一家很大公司的高级管理人员,本想与他开玩笑说现在太多的公司高管跳槽出来做基金,不料他却很严肃地说他不是跟潮流,而是因为他实在讨厌了大公司的“内部”工作。他说他原来的公司可以为了一件内部的事情搞上几个月,处理公司内部自己制造出来的工作,可是公司的努力市场看不到,客户感受不到,他感到很无奈才离开。

  我想这种沉醉于内部工作的公司不少,而且这也是很诱人的或者说迷惑人的工作方法,因为内部的问题总是重要,内部人提出来的问题一般也都是紧急的,把内部的事情治理好才能做好对外、对市场的事情也是很对的,可是太多高管的时间用在了内部,公司就形成了一个内部的循环,会议会制造会议,文件会制造文件,内部的事情多了,就会形成内部解决问题的妥协与思维,这时候公司的目标是什么容易被忘记,甚至公司存在是为了什么也容易被忘记。

  这几年公司法人治理结构很重要,大家花了很多时间在治理上;这几年公司内部架构调整多,大家花了很多时间在架构上;这几年公司讲发展战略多,大家花了很多时间在战略讨论上;这几年公司内部评价体系很重要,大家花了很多时间在评价系统上。这些事情当然很重要,很基础,而且问题会长期存在,可公司的生存和发展不允许我们仅仅停留在这些问题上,特别是不能停留在对这些问题的内部不断讨论上。公司做好这些事情的出发点应该是来自于外部的,来自于外部市场,客户和竞争的要求。

  多元化企业讲内部协同,往往进展很难,除去有商业模式的设计以外,把内部的问题推到外部让客户自己去解决是典型的思维方法。内部协同讲了很久,问题很多,用了不少精力,可表现在市场上,客户没有感受到效率和利益。一个组织大了,内部结构复杂了,不仅是效率容易低,而更危险的倾向是把解决内部自身的矛盾和问题当成主要工作目标,而忘记了所有内部工作的目的是为了服务外部的要求。

  记得几年前看到一家公司的组织架构图,他们没有如一般的公司一样,把官大的画在上面,把官小的画在下面,而是把客户画在了组织架构图的最上方,接下来是公司最接近市场的部门,董事会放在了最下面。问他们为什么,他们回答说公司组织设计的一切目的是为了服务客户,董事会不过是在推动这个组织更有效率地服务客户。

  从公司的组织文化来看,整体的,服务客户、服务公司业绩目标的文化占了主流,公司才是积极向上的。公司内部的热点话题是市场,是产品,是客户,是创新,是品牌,是业绩,公司才有竞争力。公司因为组织内部管理而做的工作当然很重要,但目的要很清楚。这就像盖房子,不能只打地基,老是不封顶,不入住;也像踢足球,不能只是中场传带,没有临门一脚;又像学生上学,不能只会努力复习,不会考试。在公司里,不能只关注内部管理过程,最终没有销售。内与外的平衡,由内到外的转变,是公司进步的过程。

来源:中国企业法律保障网 企业忠良   加入时间:2008-7-2

Chinese board structures 'lead to confusion'

By Tom Mitchell in Hong Kong

Published: April 3 2008 03:00 | Last updated: April 3 2008 03:00

Board structures at Chinese companies can lead to "confusion, ambiguity and potentially . . . undermine the board of directors", according to a study of the corporate governance risks faced by investors in China.

The report by Risk Metrics, which advises more than 2,000 institutional investor clients, said factors including China's two-tier boards and a well-crafted but untested regulatory regime continue to make the country a risky destination for overseas investors, especially when compared with Hong Kong.

China's company law requires Chinese companies to establish a "board of supervisors", usually chaired by an employee representative from the All China Federation of Trade Unions, the country's only government-sanctioned union.

Other members of the supervisory board typically include an official from the company's internal Chinese Communist party committee and at least one other person elected by shareholders. Company directors and other senior managers are not allowed to sit on the board of supervisors.

"Recent company law developments . . . have clarified and added weight to [the supervisory board's] role," Risk Metrics said.

"These changes emphasise its monitoring role and charge it with ensuring the company's stability.

"Specifically, the board of supervisors is charged with reviewing the company's finances [and] supervising the board of directors and senior management . . . In and of itself, this financial oversight role can create confusion."

The role and influence of ACFTU branches and party committees at Chinese state-owned companies is even more vague. It is also not uncommon for senior executives suspected of corruption to be detained - without explanation - by the party's disciplinary inspection committee before reappearing months or years later in a criminal court.

Risk Metrics noted minority shareholders in the two jurisdictions do face some common risks. The state's firm grip over China's largest industrial and financial companies is mirrored in Hong Kong by the influence of tycoons and their families

The Chinese government typically holds stakes of 65 per cent or more in large state companies. Hong Kong tycoons exercise similar control through 51 per cent shareholdings.

"There is a cohort of investors who feel comfortable [with] what they don't know in Hong Kong," said Dean Paatsch of Risk Metric's governance division. "It's very hard to get your arms around what you don't know in China."

 

Chinese corporate governance 'untested'

By Steve Johnson

Published: April 7 2008 03:00 | Last updated: April 7 2008 03:00

Foreign investors in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets should not pin too much faith on China's "largely untested" corporate governance provisions, according to RiskMetrics Group, a provider of risk management services.

China opened its mainland equity markets up to Qualified Foreign Institutional Investors in 2002 and has since reformed its securities markets, mandated independent directors, made it easier to sue directors and brought financial reporting largely into line with international standards.

However, David Smith, analyst at RiskMetrics, cautioned: "Our view is that whilst laws and regulations have been enacted that look good on paper, corporate governance culture is not so well developed. Laws and regulations remain largely untested."

Among the concerns raised by RiskMetrics are the lack of investor protection afforded by independent directors, given that they are effectively appointed by majority owners, often the state; a shortage of trained and experienced auditors and accountants; and a relative lack of protection from insider trading. It has called for the definition of insider to be widened to include former directors and executives to help combat this latter point.

China's board structures can also lead to "confusion and ambiguity".

"Until share ownership becomes more widely dispersed, investors are unlikely to see progress toward a culture of genuine independent directorship," said Mr Smith. "Investors should apply special scrutiny to related-party dealings in the absence of independent boards."

 

 
 
 
 

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