Since the end of the second world war, American economic policy has supported an integrated global economy, stimulating development in poor countries, particularly in Asia, at unprecedented rates. Yet America’s commitment to internationalist economic policy is ever more in doubt. Even before the significant increases in unemployment likely in the months ahead, the indicators are all disturbing. Presidential candidates attack the North American Free Trade Agreement. The Colombian free trade agreement languishes. There are increasing attacks on foreign investment in the US, not to mention growing support for restrictive immigration policies.

To all of this the conventional wisdom has a well developed response, with four standard elements. First, the sceptic regarding trade deals or other internationalist policies is educated around the many benefits of trade, not just for exporters but also for consumers and the economy more generally.

Second, the sceptic is assured that the trade agreement in question is not just good classical economics that reaps the gains available from comparative advantage – it is also good mercantilism. This is because the US already has low trade barriers, which it will typically not need to reduce as much as its trading partner. Sometimes the argument is added that we are in competition with other major economic powers and will be at a disadvantage if a developing country has a free-trade agreement with them but not us.

Third, the sceptic is also told that most of the observed increases in income inequality in the American economy are due to new technology rather than increased trade – and that even to the extent that trade has a role, most increases in trade are not attributable to trade agreements.

Fourth, it is acknowledged that while trade agreements are good for the economy overall, not everyone wins. And so it is increasingly recognised that they must be complemented by more ambitious efforts to reduce income inequality and income insecurity. Sometimes the discussion focuses on adjustment assistance of various kinds. More recently, there has been a recognition of the need for much broader-gauged efforts to combat inequality and insecurity, such as universal healthcare.

All of these points have the very considerable virtue of being correct economic arguments. Taken together, they make a compelling case that the US is better off with than without trade agreements and that the world will be a richer, safer place with increasing economic integration. It is very possible that, if efforts to help those left behind are pursued with sufficient vigour, support for economic internationalism can be maintained.

But I suspect that the policy debate in the US, and probably in some other countries as well, will need to confront a deeper and broader issue: the gnawing suspicion of many that the very object of internationalist economic policy – the growing prosperity of the global economy – may not be in their interests. As Paul Samuelson pointed out several years ago, the valid proposition that trade barriers hurt an economy does not imply the corollary that it necessarily benefits from the economic success of its trading partners.

When other countries develop, American producers benefit from having larger markets to sell into but are challenged by more formidable competition. Which effect predominates cannot be judged a priori. But there are reasons to think that economic success abroad will be more problematic for American workers in the future.

First, developing countries increasingly export goods such as computers that the US produces on a significant scale, putting pressure on wages. At the same time, rising global prosperity increases the rewards accruing to the already highly paid producers of intellectual property goods such as films, where the US has a comparative advantage. Second, the growth of countries such as China raises competition for energy and environmental resources, raising the price for Americans.

Third and most fundamentally, growth in the global economy encourages the development of stateless elites whose allegiance is to global economic success and their own prosperity rather than the interests of the nation where they are headquartered. As one prominent chief executive put it in Davos this year: “We will be fine however America does but I hope for its sake that it will cut taxes and reduce regulation and put more pressure on young people to study in the ways that are necessary for it to be able to keep competing successfully.”

The chief executive was sincere and he captured an important truth. Even as globalisation increases inequality and insecurity, it is constantly and often legitimately invoked as an argument against the viability of progressive taxation, support for labour unions, strong regulation and substantial production of public goods that mitigate its adverse impacts.

In a world where Americans can legitimately doubt whether the success of the global economy is good for them, it will be increasingly difficult to mobilise support for economic internationalism. The focus must shift from supporting internationalism as traditionally defined to designing an internationalism that more successfully aligns the interests of working people and the middle class in rich countries with the success of the global economy. This will be the subject of my next column, which will appear on Monday May 5.

The writer is the Charles W. Eliot university professor at Harvard

Top economists debate Martin Wolf’s and Lawrence Summers’ columns in the FT’s Economists’ Forum

The most important reason for doubting that an increasingly successful, integrated global economy will benefit US workers (and those in other industrial countries) is the weakening of the link between the success of a nation’s workers and the success of both its trading partners and its companies. This phenomenon was first emphasised years ago by Robert Reich, the former US labour secretary. The normal argument is that a more rapidly growing global economy benefits workers and companies in an individual country by expanding the market for exports. This is a valid consideration. But it is also true that the success of other countries, and greater global integration, places more competitive pressure on an individual economy. Workers are likely disproportionately to bear the brunt of this pressure.

Part of the reason why US workers (or those in Europe and Japan) enjoy high wages is that they are more highly skilled than most workers in the developing world. Yet they also earn higher wages because they can be more productive – their effort is complemented by capital, broadly defined to include equipment, managerial expertise, corporate culture, infrastructure and the capacity for innovation. In a closed economy anything that promotes investment in productive capital necessarily raises workers’ wages. In a closed economy, corporations have a huge stake in the quality of the national workforce and infrastructure.

The situation is very different in an open economy where investments in innovation, brands, a strong corporate culture or even in certain kinds of equipment can be combined with labour from anywhere in the world. Workers no longer have the same stake in productive investment by companies as it becomes easier for corporations to combine their capital with lower priced labour overseas. Companies, in turn, come to have less of a stake in the quality of the workforce and infrastructure in their home country when they can produce anywhere. Moreover businesses can use the threat of relocating as a lever to extract concessions regarding tax policy, regulations and specific subsidies. Inevitably the cost of these concessions is borne by labour.

The public policy response of withdrawing from the global economy, or reducing the pace of integration,is ultimately untenable. It would generate resentment abroad on a dangerous scale, hurt the economy as other countries retaliated, and make us less competitive as companies in rival countries continue to integrate their production lines with developing countries. As Bill Clinton said in his first major international economic speech as president, “the United States must compete not retreat”.

The domestic component of a strategy to promote healthy globalisation must rely on strengthening efforts to reduce inequality and insecurity. The international component must focus on the interests of working people in all countries, in addition to the current emphasis on the priorities of global ­corporations.

First, the US should take the lead in promoting global co-operation in the international tax arena. There has been a race to the bottom in the taxation of corporate income as nations lower their rates to entice business to issue more debt and invest in their jurisdictions. Closely related is the problem of tax havens that seek to lure wealthy citizens with promises that they can avoid paying taxes altogether on large parts of their fortunes. It might be inevitable that globalisation leads to some increases in inequality; it is not necessary that it also compromise the possibility of progressive taxation.

Second, an increased focus of international economic diplomacy should be to prevent harmful regulatory competition. In many areas it is appropriate that regulations differ between countries in response to local circumstances. But there is a reason why progressives in the early part of the 20th century sought to have the federal government take over many kinds of regulatory responsibility. They were concerned that competition for business across states, and their ease of being able to move, would lead to a race to the bottom. Financial regulation is only one example of where the mantra of needing to be “internationally competitive” has been invoked too often as a reason to cut back on regulation. There has not been enough serious consideration of the alternative – global co-operation to raise standards. While labour standards arguments have at times been invoked as a cover for protectionism, and this must be avoided, it is entirely appropriate that US policymakers seek to ensure that greater global integration does not become an excuse for eroding labour rights.

To benefit the interests of US citizens and command broad political support, US international economic policy will need to focus on the issues in which the largest number of Americans have the greatest stake. A decoupling of the interests of businesses and nations may be inevitable; a decoupling of international economic policies and the interests of American workers is not.

The writer is the Charles W. Eliot university professor at Harvard University

Top economists debate Martin Wolf’s and Lawrence Summers’ columns in the FT’s Economists’ Forum

Proposals for changes in regulation and crisis response have come from many quarters, including the US Treasury and private sector groups. They offer important ideas on rearranging regulatory responsibilities – such as the Treasury’s suggestion of an enhanced role for the Federal Reserve with respect to investment banks and its call for a consumer financial regulator – and raise critical issues, such as that of procyclicality induced by regulation. They also contain a certain amount of essentially content-free calls for worthiness. So far missing from the debate has been a set of principles describing the properties of any desirable regulatory regime, against which proposals can be evaluated. Different observers will assign priority to different issues – here would be my list of six principles.

First, there should be a strong presumption against having regulators competing to supervise particular institutions or activities. Experience suggests that even when firms do not have the option of switching, there are substantial risks that regulators will be co-opted. Adding “forum shopping” exacerbates the problem.

Second, it should be recognised that to a substantial extent self-regulation is deregulation. Allowing institutions to determine capital levels based on risk models of their own design is tantamount to letting them set their own capital levels. We have seen institutions hurt again and again by events to which their models implied probabilities of less than one in a million. Where it is desired to impose capital requirements, this should be done in a way that can be monitored by supervisors on the basis of balance sheet data.

Third, regulation must be premised on the inability of institutions or their regulators to predict future market conditions with much confidence. As obvious as the subprime crisis may look in retrospect, it was not widely foreseen 18 months ago even by those worried about complacency in credit markets. As the fact that the Dow Jones index was below 6,500 when Alan Greenspan famously spoke of irrational exuberance illustrates, it is also easy to see bubbles even when assets are undervalued or properly valued, as US stocks were in 1996. Rather than judging where and when the next crisis will occur, regulators need to try to assure the resilience of the system with respect to economic shocks or problems in any one sector or institution.

Fourth, the focus of regulation must shift from the prudential practices of individual institutions to the health of the financial system. The proper focus of government regulation is not on how good a job managements do of looking out for their shareholders and bondholders. It is on the potential external consequences of their actions. This will require efforts to limit excesses when times are good and institutions appear robust – and efforts to avoid deleveraging in difficult times if that increases pressures on others. Prudence at the level of any one institution does involve more leverage at times when volatility is low than when it is high. The problem is that when any institution seeks to do what is prudent for it and sell off assets, it impairs the environment in which all others are operating and creates the kind of vicious cycle, in which liquidations beget declining prices and further liquidations, that we have just been through.

Fifth, any regulatory regime must address the risks arising from “parallel banking activities” in a realistic way. We have been reminded by recent events of the old truth that borrowing short and lending long with limited capital is always at the root of financial crisis. This type of activity is not confined to banks and their offshoots. It is practised by bond guarantors, hedge funds, mortgage institutions and some insurance companies among others. If capital requirements are raised only on one set of institutions, problems may be exacerbated as activity migrates to those that are not regulated. On the other hand, regulating all potentially highly leveraged entities is a formidable task. There is no ideal answer. But the fear is that regulation that ensures the regulated can compete fairly with the unregulated is regulation that either promises government subsidy or does not raise capital requirements much above market levels.

Sixth, regulatory policy must to the maximum extent possible create a situation in which the failure of an individual institution is not itself a source of systemic risk. Only in this way is it possible to contain the moral hazards associated with government support. The authorities had no realistic choice but to provide support as Bear Stearns faced bankruptcy. They do have a choice as to whether to put in place a regime where such problems can be managed with no government financial support provided directly or indirectly to shareholders or unsecured creditors. A resolution regime that could apply to any financial institution that became a source of systemic risk should be an urgent priority.

These principles are more easily asserted than they are reflected in an actual regulatory system. I hope to return in future columns to the question of regulatory system design.

The writer is the Charles W. Eliot university professor at Harvard University and a managing director of the D.E. Shaw group. The opinions here are his own

Top economists debate Martin Wolf’s and Lawrence Summers’ columns in the FT’s Economists’ Forum

There is enormous uncertainty around economic or financial forecasts. It is possible that pessimism will recede as declining interest rates and dollar exchange rates increase demand. It is more likely, though, that the situation will deteriorate further as perceptions of declining growth increase credit spreads and risk premiums in financial markets, leading to reduced lending, borrowing and spending exacerbating the pessimism about growth.

Perhaps inevitably given the complexity of the problems, policy measures have seemed ad hoc and reactive: measures to increase bank liquidity one week; to help homeowners avoid foreclosure another; to work towards fiscal stimulus another; to lower interest rates most recently. Confidence would be well served by a comprehensive programme of measures that offers the prospect of accelerating growth and insures against a prolonged downturn. Until that happens, it will be difficult for confidence to return.

Substantial monetary and fiscal stimulus is now in train. This will reduce the severity of any recession and provide some insurance against a protracted downturn. Along with macro-economic stimulus in the US, there is the need for further policy development in three other areas – repair of the financial system, containing the damage caused by the housing sector and assuring the global co-ordination of policy. This column addresses the first of these imperatives; I will address the remainder in the near future.

Financial institutions are holding all sorts of credit instruments that are impaired but are difficult to value, creating uncertainty and freezing new lending. Without more visibility, the economy and financial system risk freezing up as Japan’s did in the 1990s.

It is therefore tempting to suggest that paper be aggressively marketed so that prices can be “discovered” and uncertainty resolved. More of this needs to happen. But in the current environment few are looking to increase risk and even fewer are willing to finance increased risk-taking. As a consequence, the prices discovered are likely to be very low and to reflect market conditions more than underlying credit quality. This could trigger cascading liquidations leading to panic.

Proper policy regarding valuing assets and forcing their sale depends on distinguishing between prices that reflect fundamentals and prices that reflect current illiquidity. Good policy is art as much as science, depending as it does on market psychology as well as the underlying realities.

The essential element, if there is to be more transparency in the financial system without a major credit crunch, is increased levels of capital. More capital permits more recognition of impairments and makes asset transfers easier by increasing the number of potential purchasers. It is preferable for the economy that banks bolster their capital positions by diluting current owners than by shrinking their lending activities. A critical element of regulatory policy should be insisting on increased capital in existing financial institutions. From this perspective the recent efforts by a number of major financial institutions to raise capital from sovereign wealth funds are constructive. But more will be necessary.

Efforts to infuse capital into existing institutions should be matched by a greater effort to ensure transparent and fair valuations. A capital market where the same loan is valued at one price in a bank, another in a different bank, another in a conduit and yet another as a hedge fund asset to be margined cannot be the basis for sound economic performance.

It is critical that sufficient capital is infused into the bond insurance industry as soon as possible. Their failure or loss of a AAA rating is a potential source of systemic risk. Probably it will be necessary to turn in part to those companies that have a stake in guarantees remaining credible because they have large holdings of guaranteed paper. It appears unlikely that repair will take place without some encouragement and involvement by financial authorities. Though there are many differences and the current problem is more complex, the Long-Term Capital Management work-out is an example of successful public sector involvement.

While attention to date has focused on capital infusions into existing institutions, it would be desirable for capital to be injected into new institutions that do not have the legacy problems of existing ones and can meet the demand for new lending. Warren Buffett’s recent entry into bond insurance is an example. There are grounds for concern about the adequacy of the flow of lending for student loans, automobiles, consumer credit and non-conforming mortgages. In each of these areas, there may be a need for collective private action or for government measures.

Normal economic performance will not return without a return to normality in the credit markets. The fear that pervades the markets will not abate of its own accord, nor is there a silver bullet. But consistent, determined approaches to doing what is needed to resolve each of the problems that arise will, in the end, re-establish confidence.

The writer is the Charles W. Eliot university professor at Harvard University

Top economists debate Martin Wolf’s and Lawrence Summers’ columns in the FT’s Economists’ Forum